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THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF PRESIDENTIAL
SIGNING STATEMENTS:
A NOTE ON H.R. 5993 - THE PRESIDENTIAL

SIGNING STATEMENTS ACT OF 2008
FaithJoseph Jackson*
ABSTRACT

This legislative note will examine H.R. 5993, the Presidential Signing
Statements Act of 2008, by addressing the history of presidential signing
statements, the use of presidential signing statements by recent administrations,
and what gave rise to the American Bar Association Task Force on Presidential
Signing Statements and Separation of Powers Doctrine. This paper will also
discuss the contents of H.R. 5993, the likelihood of it passing muster through
Congress and the executive branch, and if so, its impact on current
administration and its immediate successor.
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INTRODUCTION

When Congress reconvenes in September 2008, after its summer recess,
legislation will be revisited with the hope of some bills being passed into law.
Amongst the many pieces of legislation that will be reviewed is H.R. 5993, the
Presidential Signing Statements Act of 2008.1 Introduced in May 2008 by
Representative Walter B. Jones, the purpose of the bill is "to promote
and political
congressional
and public awareness, understanding,
2
accountability of presidential signing statements." At the heart of this bill is a
portion of the findings of the American Bar Association Task Force on
In
Presidential Signing Statements and Separation of Powers Doctrine.
response to the challenges and changing role of presidential signing statements,
in June 2006, the ABA Task Force examined the constitutional and legal issues
of signing statements. 3 In July 2006, the Task Force presented a resolution on
its findings, voicing the need for the current president and his successors to
respect the country's constitutional system of separation of powers and thus
accentuate the importance of the doctrine of separation of powers.4 A portion
of the ABA Task Force Report:
[U]rges Congress to enact legislation requiring the President promptly to
submit to Congress an official copy of all signing statements he issues.. . to
submit to Congress a report setting forth in full the reasons and legal basis for
the statement; and further requiring that all such submissions be available in
5
a publicly accessible database.
It is this segment of the ABA Task Force Report that serves as the spirit of H.R.
5993.
There is a long history of presidential signing statements. 6 However, the
use of signing statements by recent administrations to make constitutional
objections to legislation and push for the signing statement to be recognized as
7
part of the legislative history has triggered closer scrutiny of this process.
Through the Presidential Signing Statements Act of 2008, it is hoped that
1. Presidential Signing Statements Act of 2008, H. R. 5993, 110th Cong. (2008).
2. Id.
3. Press Release, American Bar Association, ABA to Examine Constitutional, Legal Issues of
Presidential Signing Statements (June 5, 2008) [hereinafter ABA June 5, 2008 Press Release],
http://www.abanet.org/media/releases/news060506.html.
4. ABA TASK FORCE ON PRESIDENTIAL SIGNING STATEMENTS AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS
ABA
TASK
FORCE
REPORT],
REPORT
5
(2006)
[hereinafter
DOCTRINE
recommendationhttp://www.abanet.org/op/signingstatements/aba-final-signing-statementsreport7-24-06.pdf.
5. Id. at 24.
6. LouIs FISHER, CONSTITU-TIONAL CONFLICTS BETWEEN CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENT 123 (5th
ed. 2007).
7. PHILLIP J. COOPER, BY ORDER OF THE PRESIDENT, 204-209 (2002); see also Charlie Savage, Bush
Challenges Hundredsof Laws, BOSTON GLOBE, April 30, 2006, at Al.
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political accountability of presidential signing statements will be achieved,
along with a greater understanding and awareness of signing statements by
Congress and the public.
This legislative note will examine the Presidential Signing Statements Act of
2008 by addressing the history of presidential signing statements, the use of
presidential signing statements by recent administrations, and what gave rise to
the ABA Task Force. This paper will also discuss the contents of H.R. 5993, the
likelihood of it passing muster through Congress and the executive branch, and
its potential impact on current administration and its immediate successor.
I.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Presidents use presidential signing statements to voice their opinions about
specific provisions of legislation approved by Congress. Presidents use them to
speak against provisions of a bill they do not embrace without having to veto
the bill. 8 The signing statement usually originates in the counsel's office of the
White House or the Justice Department. 9 The signing statement comes into
play at the same time as the last step of the law making process. 10 When the
statute is signed into law by the president, it is usually the same time that the
signed signing statement is issued. 11
The practice of signing statements dates back to the earliest days of the
republic. 12 The constitutionality of this executive practice has often been
question and debated. 13 Scholars and commentaries differ as to the effect of a
signing statement, some believing that it has the same force as law, and others
not.1 4 Certain supporters of signing statements believe that a signing statement
becomes problematic only if the statute itself is unclear as a result of
congressional actions. 15 Their position is that ambiguities in a bill require
constitutional interpretation by the courts at a later time. 16 Even before the bill
is subjected to judicial review, the executive branch is faced with the task of
determining statutory meaning and constitutionality. 17 Others believe that the
president should be prohibited from using signing statements in order to avoid
enforcing a law of questionable constitutionality. 18 Supporters of this theory
claim the usage of signing statements is a directly undermines the separation of
powers between the executive branch and legislative branches. 19
The

8. The News Hour with Jim Lehr: President's Use of 'Signing Statements' Raises Constitutional
Concerns, (PBS television broadcast July 24, 2006) [hereinafter News Hour], transcript available at
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/ white-house/july-dec06/signing-07-24.html.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. FISHER, supra note 6 at 123; see also News Hour, supra note 8.
13. News Hour, supra note 8.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. News Hour, supra note 8.
19. Id.
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Constitution affords the president veto power. 20 However, signing statements
allow the president to sign a bill into law while declaring a provision of it
unconstitutional, all while foregoing his veto power.
A.

Article I Section 7 (2): Legislative Power of the Executive Branch

The power to veto a bill, although exercised by the executive branch, is
legislative in nature. 21 Granted by Article I, Section 7 of the United States
Constitution, the veto power affords the president the power to prevent a bill
from becoming law.22 If Congress seeks passage of legislation that the
president does not support, the president can veto the legislation with the effect
of preventing it from becoming law. 23 The president can withhold his support
of a bill due to questions of constitutional compliance, or simply because he
believes a bill to be unwise. 24 Whatever reason or reasons the president may
have to not support a piece of legislation, he can show his non-endorsement
simply by not signing the bill into law. Constitutional power is given to the
president to veto the bill if he has concerns about it; whether he does not favor
25
the legislation in its entirety or only certain provisions of the bill.
Thus, the question is: why is it necessary to have a tool that allows the
president to "unendorse" a piece of legislation that he previously endorsed?
This is essentially the effect of presidential signing statements. All parts of a
signing statement are not controversial in nature, as some parts simply
recognize and express appreciation to supporters of the bill.26 However, the
parts that are questioned are very controversial. The portions of the signing
statements that allow the president to refrain from executing a law that he just
27
previously signed are cloaked with controversy.
The power of Congress to create law is clearly stated in the Constitution; as
is the power of the President to enforce law and the power of the judiciary to
interpret law.28 Although not ever specifically mentioned in the Constitution,
this "separation of powers" has been recognized since the government's
inception. Specific powers are designated to each of the three branches of
government, clarifying powers, duties, and responsibilities. 29 Where powers
are granted to a particular branch, that branch has not only the authority, but
the responsibility to exercise that authority. The Constitution bestows upon the
president an exclusive power that arms him with the authority and

20. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl.2.
21. Id.; see also News Hour, supra note 8.
22. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 7, cl.
2.
23. Id.; see also News Hour, supra note 8; Chad Thompson, PresidentialSigning Statements: The Big
Impact of a Little Known Presidential Tool, 39 U. TOL. L. REV. 185, 196 (2007).
24. News Hour,supra note 8.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. FISHER, supra note 6; see also News Hour, supra note 8.
28. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1; U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1; U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
29. DANIEL E. HALL & RANSFORD C. PYLE, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND COMMENTARY 46
(1997).
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This
responsibility to reject a bill that he believes is unconstitutional. 30
executive veto power, which is legislative in nature, was created by the framers
31
of the Constitution as part of creating a system of "checks and balances."
Article I, section 7 of the Constitution gives the president the power to veto a
bill he does not accept; the power plays a significant role in shaping
legislation.32 If the president believes that Congress is overstepping its bounds,
the president may use his or her veto power. 33 It should be noted that this
power is not absolute. 34 Congress can override the veto.35 However, the rate of
congressional veto overrides is very low, which gives greater credence to the
power and impact of a presidential veto.36 If the president believes that a bill or
a portion of the bill is unconstitutional, or if for some other reason he believes it
should not be supported, he needs only to threaten Congress with a
presidential veto.3 7 The mere threat of a presidential veto has the potential and
probability of influencing Congress to make changes that are favorable to the
president to ensure passing of the bill. 38 It seems that it would make more
sense for the president to challenge a bill before it becomes legislation through
the powers granted by Article I of the Constitution. To sign a bill into law and
then immediately draft a document that challenges the law and declare its
unconstitutionality, followed by non-enforcement of the law, is contrary to
39
what the Constitution's framers had in mind.
II.

PRACTICE OF PRESIDENTIAL SIGNING STATEMENTS BY RECENT
ADMINISTRATIONS

The use of presidential signing statements as an executive power tool to
influence the implementation and interpretation of law is relatively new and
evolving. 40 Other functions that signing statements are and, until recently,
were more frequently used to achieve include: providing explanation to the
public, provide legislative interpretation and administration guidance to
subordinates, and provide questions and concerns of constitutionality of the
enactment. 41 However, the use of presidential signing statements as a means of
presidential direct action dates back to the Reagan administration. 42 This recent

7.
30. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 7, cl.
31. HALL & PYLE, supra note 29, at 48.
32. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl.2.
33. News Hour, supra note 8.
34. Id.
35. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl.2; Frontline: Cheney's Law, Signing Statements (PBS television
at
transcript
available
Oct.
16,
2007),
broadcast
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/cheney/ themes/ statements.html.
36. News Hour, supra note 8.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl.
2; Frontline: Cheney's Law, Signing Statements, supra note 35.
40. COOPER, supra note 7, at 201.
41. Memorandum from Walter Dellinger, Assistant Att'y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, to
Bernard Nussbaum, Counsel to the President (Nov. 3, 1993) [hereinafter OLC 1993 Signing
Statement Opinion], availableat http://www.usdoj.gov/olc/signing.htm.
42. COOPER, supra note 7, at 201.
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use of presidential signing statements as post-enactment legislative history with
the expectation of the courts to give some deference to its content when
analyzing the legislation has spawned a great deal of controversy. 43 The
Reagan, Bush I, and Clinton administrations have all used presidential signing
statements to nullify a statute or provide the reigning president's interpretation
of a statute. 44 And more recently, President George W. Bush has used a large
number of presidential signing statements to constitutionally challenge new
45
laws rather than exercise his veto power.
During the Reagan Administration, the judiciary was encouraged to defer
to presidential signing statements when faced with statutory interpretation. As
early as 1986, President Reagan's supported his increased use of signing
statements with language from a Justice Department memorandum asserting
the importance of the president's understanding of a bill in comparison to
Congress' understanding. 46 Under the administration of Attorney General
Meese, the signing statement's usage was expanded. It would now be used to
play a more active role in judicial interpretation. Strategically, the views of the
president as expressed in a signing statement would be presented as a
legitimate and authoritative part of the statute's legislative history. 47 This
expansive usage was successfully promoted through an agreement between
Meese and West Publishing Company to include signing statements in West's
U.S. Code Congressional and Administrative News publication, a commonly used
48
source of legislative history.
Like the Reagan Administration, President George H. W. Bush's
administration also opined that the president has the power to refuse to enforce
a bill that he determines to be unconstitutional. 49 The administration could use
its interpretation to save legislation that it viewed as constitutionally
defective. 50 The administration's position was strategically implemented in
passing civil rights legislation in the early 1990's- what ultimately became the
Civil Rights Act of 1991.51 Reacting to a series of Supreme Court interpretations
of Title VII that had ultimately weakened the effectiveness of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, Congress found itself negotiating with the Bush administration
about 1990 civil rights legislation. 52 What would have been the Civil Rights Act

43. OLC 1993 Signing Statement Opinion, supra note 41; Note, Context-Sensitive Deference to
PresidentialSigning Statements, 120 HARV. L. REV. 597, 602, 603 (2006).
44. COOPER, supra note 7, at 200.
45. John W. Dean, The Problem with PresidentialSigning Statements: Their Use and Misuse by the
Bush
Administration,
FINDLAW.COM,
Jan.
13,
2006,
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/dean/20060113.html.
46. Erin Louise Palmer, Reinterpreting Torture: Presidential Signing Statements and the
Circumvention of U.S. and International Law, 14 Hum. RTS. BRIEF 21, 21 (2006), available at
http://www.wcl.american.edu/hrbrief/14/lpalmer.pdf?rd=l.
47. COOPER, supra note 7, at 202.
48. Id. at 203; OLC 1993 Signing Statement Opinion, supra note 41; see also Bowsher v. Synar, 478
U.S. 717, 719 n.1 (1986) (President Reagan's signing statements cited by the Supreme Court
upholding Reagan's challenged Presidential powers).
49. COOPER, supra note 7, at 206-07.
50. Id. at 207.
51. Id.
52. Id.
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of 1990 was vetoed, but it was followed by the passage of the Civil Rights Act of
1991. 53 The Act was accompanied by a signing statement that recognized the
54
administration's analysis as "authoritative interpretive guidance."
As did its predecessors, the Clinton administration also supported
presidential signing statements. Although President Clinton's use of signing
statements was diminutive when he had a Democratic Congress, the success of
the Republican Party during the 1994 mid-term elections presented him with
legislative challenges.5 5 Clinton's practice of using signing statements changed
in response to the new challenges.5 6 Walter Dellinger, who served as Assistant
Attorney General and acting Solicitor General during the Clinton
administration, presented historical and constitutional justification for a
President's refusal to follow "unconstitutional" legislation. 57 Recognizing and
supporting appropriate cause to use signing statements, Dellinger concluded
that a President's refusal to enforce a legislative provision was justified when
the provision encroached on the President's constitutional powers. 58 In his
Statement on Signing the Coast Guard Authorization Act of 1996, President Clinton
stated that the Act's restriction on the powers of appointment of the executive
branch was not permitted by the Appointments Clause.59 President Clinton
raised an objection to a portion of the Act that restricted the executive branch's
powers of appointment of committee members, arguing that the restriction
raised constitutional concerns. 60 President Clinton interpreted the restrictions
61
as non-binding with only an advisory status.

53. Id.
54. Statement on Signing the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1504, 1504 (Nov. 21, 1991);
see also COOPER, supra note 7, at 207 (explaining the impact of the signing statement: "(1) established
the administration's reading for the legislative history, (2) sought to influence future judicial
interpretations, (3) set boundaries on the meaning of the relevant sections of the statute, and (4)
controlled implementation").
55. COOPER, supra note 7, at 215; ABA TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 4, at 13.
56. COOPER, supra note 7, at 215; ABA TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 4, at 13.
57. OLC 1993 Signing Statement Opinion, supra note 41, at 133.
58. Id.; FISHER, supra at note 6, at 124-125; ABA TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 4, at 13.
59. Curtis A. Bradley & Eric A. Posner, PresidentialSigning Statements and Executive Power, 23
CONST. COMMENT. 307, 326 (2006); Statement on Signing the Coast Guard Authorization Act of
1996, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1869, 1869-1870 (Oct. 19, 1996) (explaining how the President believes the Act
presents a constitutional problem and how he will interpret it).
60. Bradley & Posner, supra note 59, at 326-27.
61. Statement on Signing the Coast Guard Authorization Act of 1996. supra note 59, at 1870
("One section of the Act, Section 1002, raises a constitutional concern. This section establishes a
committee empowered to select the entities to which certain historic lighthouses will be conveyed.
Because the committee members will hold a Federal office and because this section vests them with
significant authority, they must be appointed as officers pursuant to the Appointments Clause of
the Constitution. The Act, however, provides that the Secretary of Transportation "shall" appoint
four of the committee's five members from among persons recommended or designated by certain
Maine officials or organizations. The Appointments Clause does not permit such restrictions to be
imposed upon the executive branch's powers of appointment. Therefore, I will not interpret section
1002(d) (3) (A) of the Act as binding, and I direct the Secretary of Transportation to regard the
designations and recommendations arising from it as advisory only.")

8
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III. THE ADVENT OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION TASK FORCE ON
PRESIDENTIAL SIGNING STATEMENTS AND SEPARATION OF POWERS DOCTRINE

As referenced earlier, signing statements date as far back as Andrew
Jackson in the 1800s, 6 2 but it is the current usage of signing statements that has
generated a significant amount of controversy. Presidents of both political
parties have used signing statements devoid of protest to express their intent
not to enforce a legislative provision they recognized as unconstitutional
without vetoing the bill in its entirety. 63 Commentators have defended the use
of presidential signing statements to articulate the executive branch's
comprehension of a law and to guide judicial interpretation. 64 Nevertheless,
former President George W. Bush has spawned an insurmountable level of
interest and concern through his signing statements practice. Triggered by an
article on the use of presidential signing statements that appeared in the Boston
Globe,65 the controversy surrounding President Bush's signing statements drew
national attention from both critics and supporters. Approximately two
months following the publication of the article, the Senate Judiciary Committee
held a hearing on Presidential signing statements. 66 Responding to the
intensity and the topical concern surrounding President Bush's constitutional
challenges, the American Bar Association created a task force (the "ABA Task
Force"). 67 Under the direction of ABA President Michael S. Greco, the ABA
appointed a diverse panel to the ABA Task Force on Presidential Signing
Statements and the Separation of Powers Doctrine. 68 The directive given to the
ABA Task Force required the committee to "examine the changing role of
presidential signing statements, in which U.S. presidents articulate their views
of provisions in newly enacted laws, attaching statements to the new legislation
before forwarding it to the Federal Register" and to "consider whether such
statements conflict with express statutory language or congressional intent." 69
A.

George W. Bush's Use of Signing Statements

In April 2006, an article appeared in the Boston Globe highlighting the
unprecedented use of signing statements by President George Bush.70 It was
reported that President Bush had aggressively used signing statements to
62. COOPER, supra note 7, at 203 ("Some of the earliest signing statements concerned efforts to
alter spending legislation, such as Andrew Jackson's modification in 1830 of an appropriation for
roads.").
63. Laurence H. Tribe, 'Signing Statements' are a Phantom Target, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 9, 2006, at
A9,
available
at
http://www.boston.com/news/nation/washington/articles/2006/08/09/signing-statements-ar
e-a-phantomtarget/.
64. Palmer, supra note 46.
65. Savage, supra note 7.
66. Presidential Signing Statements: Hearing Before the S. Judiciary Comm., 109th Cong. (2006),
http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearings/hearing.cfm?id=1969.
67. ABA June 5, 2008 Press Release, supranote 3.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Savage, supra note 7.
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disobey in excess of 750 laws, asserting that his Constitutional power as head of
the executive branch gives him the right to ignore numerous sections of
legislative bills.71 The exact number of bills that were challenged has been
debated; and in fact, it is documented that contemporary administrations that
employed the practice of issuing signing statements issued more signing
statements than President George W. Bush. 72 Recent administrations dating
back to President Reagan have all used signing statements. President Reagan
issued 250 signing statements, President George H. W. Bush issued 228 signing
statements, President Clinton issued 381 signing statements, and President
George W. Bush issued 152 signing statements. 73 However, it is the alarming,
disproportional use of signing statements by incumbent President Bush to
make constitutional and legal objections in comparison to the other modern era
presidents that has given rise to concern. 74 In comparison, 34% of President
Reagan's signing statements raised constitutional objections, 47% of President
George H. W. Bush's signing statements raised constitutional objections, and
18% of President Clinton's signing statements raised constitutional objections.
78% of President George W. Bush's signing statements raised constitutional
objections. 75 This unparalleled trend has brought with it a significant amount
of controversy. Even firm supporters who champion the constitutionality and
informative value of signing statements indisputably recognize the abusive use
76
of signing statements by the current administration.
B.

Key Legislation Impacted by PresidentBush's Signing Statements

A significant percentage of President George W. Bush's signing statements
have been used to make constitutional and legal objections. 77 President Bush's
signing statements have impacted legislation addressing whistle-blowers
employed by the Department of Energy, 78 diversity promotion in the hiring
practices of the intelligence community, 79 and independent education research
and publication. 80 However, it was the signing statements of two laws that
were issued in December 2005 and March 2006 that drew attention and an
81
overall closer examination.
71. Id.
72. T.J. HALSTEAD, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, PRESIDENTIAL SIGNING STATEMENTS:
CONSTITUTIONAL AND INSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS CRS-9 (Sep. 17, 2007), available at

http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL33667.pdf.
73. Id. at CRS-2.
74. Id. at CRS-9.
75. Id. at CRS-2.
76. Tribe, supra note 63.
77. HALSTEAD, supra note 72, at CRS-2.
78. Statement on Signing the Energy Policy Act of 2005, 41 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1267
(Aug. 8, 2005).
79. Statement on Signing the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, 40
WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 2993, 2993-94 (Dec. 17, 2004).
80. Statement on Signing Legislation to Provide for Improvement of Federal Education
Research, Statistics, Evaluation, Information, and Dissemination, and for Other Purposes, 2 PUB.
PAPERS 2037,2037-38 (Nov. 5, 2002).
81. Charlie Savage, Bush Could Bypass New Torture Ban, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 4, 2006, at A1
[hereinafter
Savage,
Torture
Ban],
available
at
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President Bush's signing statement upon signing the Department of
Defense, Emergency Supplemental Appropriations to Address Hurricanes in
the Gulf of Mexico, and Pandemic Influenza Act, 2006 challenged the law's
outlawing the torture of detainees. 82 President Bush's signing statement reads:
The executive branch shall construe [the law] in a manner consistent with the
constitutional authority of the President ... as Commander in Chief and

consistent with the constitutional limitations on the judicial power, which
will assist in achieving the shared objective of the Congress and the President
83
...of protecting the American people from further terrorist attacks.
Thus, in effect, President Bush reserved his right to disregard restrictions
limiting the use of harsh torture tactics on detainees. As one expert on
presidential signing statements asserted, President Bush "will comply with this
law when [he] wants to, and if something arises in the war on terrorism where
[he] think it's important to torture or engage incruel, inhuman, and degrading
conduct, [he] [has] the authority to do so and nothing in this law is going to
84
stop [him]."
President Bush issued another signing statement in March 2006. Signing
Statement on H.R. 199 was issued, challenging a requirement that the president
provide Congress with reports detailing his use of the Patriot Act. 85 The
purpose of the bill was to assure that the special terrorism-related powers
afforded to the FBI were not abused.86 Oversight provisions were included,
requiring the administration to provide information about how the FBI was
using the Patriot Act's expanded police powers. 87 Nevertheless, President Bush
stated notwithstanding the law's requirements, he would withhold
information. President Bush stated:
The executive branch shall construe the provisions of [the law] that call for
furnishing information to entities outside the executive branch... in a manner
consistent with the President's constitutional authority to supervise the
unitary executive branch and to withhold information the disclosure of which
http://www.boston.com/news/nation/washington/ articles/ 2006/01/04/ bush-could-bypass-ne
w_tortureban/; Charlie Savage, Bush Shuns PatriotAct Requirement, BOSTON GLOBE, March 24,
2006,
at
Al
[hereinafter
Savage,
Patriot
Act],
available
at
http://www.boston.com/news/nation/washington/articles/2006/03/24/bush-shuns-patriot-act
_requirement/.
82. Statement on Signing the Department of Defense, Emergency Supplemental Appropriations
to Address Hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexico, and Pandemic Influenza Act, 2006, 41 WEEKLY COMP.
PRES. Doc. 1918, 1918-19 (Dec. 30, 2005).
83. Id. at 1919.
84. Savage, supra note 81 (quoting David Golove).
85. Statement on Signing USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, 42
WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 425, 425 (Mar. 9, 2006).
86. See USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005 § 106A, 120 Stat. 192,
200-02; see also, Charlie Savage, Bush Shuns PatriotAct Requirement, BOSTON GLOBE, March 24, 2006,
at
available
http://www.boston.com/news/nation/washington/articles/2006/03/24/bush-shunspatriot-act
_requirement/.
87. USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005 § 106A, 120 Stat. at 200-02.
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could impair foreign relations, national security, the deliberative processes of
88
the Executive, or the performance of the Executive's constitutional duties.
Once again, Bush cited to his constitutional authority to support his power
to bypass a law. The quandary is the constitutional authority that President
Bush relies on to support his legal and constitutional legislative challenges is
founded upon his subjective interpretation of the Constitution and his
executive powers.
C.

PresidentialChallenges Expressed in Signing Statements Draw Scrutiny

On the heels of the April 2006 Boston Globe article 89 was harsh criticism
from some lawmakers. 90 Coupled with the presidential challenges brought by
President Bush against recent legislation, this new interest and concern
surrounding President Bush's signing statements gave rise to the ABA Task
Force on Presidential Signing Statements and the Separation of Powers
Doctrine. The Task Force would be charged with the duty to "examine
constitutional and legal issues raised by presidents of the United States
91
attaching legal interpretations to federal legislation they sign."
Shortly after the creation of the Task Force, in June 2006, the United States
Senate Committee on the Judiciary held a hearing to address presidential
signing statements. 92 Two members of the Task Force provided testimony
before the Senate Committee. 93 During his appearance before the Committee,
Professor Charles Ogletree stated, "When the President refuses to enforce a law
on constitutional grounds without interacting with the other branches of
government, it is not only bad public policy, but also creates a unilateral and
unchecked exercise of authority in one branch of government without the
interaction and consideration of the others." 94 Bruce Fein testified, "[i]f all
other avenues have proved unavailing, Congress should contemplate
impeachment for signing statements that systematically flout the separation of
95
powers and legislative prerogatives."

88. Statement on Signing USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, 42
WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. at 425.
89. Savage, supra note 7.
90. See Charlie Savage, 3 Democrats Slam President Over Defying Statues, BOSTON GLOBE, May 2,
2006,
at
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In late July 2006, the ABA Task Force produced a thirty-two page report.
The findings of the ABA Task Force included recommendations, which were
later adopted by the American Bar Association's policy-making House of
97
Delegates.

D. ABA Task Force Recommendations
The bipartisan panel, chaired by Neal R. Sonnett and comprised of a
diverse group of legal specialists, unanimously concluded that President Bush
98
should discontinue the use of signing statements to decline to enforce a law.
Specifically, the ABA Task Force Report states:
RESOLVED, That the American Bar Association opposes, as contrary to the
rule of law and our constitutional system of separation of powers, the
issuance of presidential signing statements that claim the authority or state
the intention to disregard or decline to enforce all or part of a law the
President has signed, or to interpret such a law in a manner inconsistent with
the clear intent of Congress;

FURTHER RESOLVED, That the American Bar Association urges the
President, if he believes that any provision of a bill pending before Congress
would be unconstitutional if enacted, to communicate such concerns to
Congress prior to passage;

FURTHER RESOLVED, That the American Bar Association urges the
President to confine any signing statements to his views regarding the
meaning, purpose and significance of bills presented by Congress, and if he
believes that all or part of a bill is unconstitutional, to veto the bill in
accordance with Article I, § 7 of the Constitution of the United States, which
directs him to approve or disapprove each bill in its entirety;

FURTHER RESOLVED, That the American Bar Association urges Congress to
enact legislation requiring the President promptly to submit to Congress an
official copy of all signing statements he issues, and in any instance in which
he claims the authority, or states the intention, to disregard or decline to
enforce all or part of a law he has signed, or to interpret such a law in a
manner inconsistent with the clear intent of Congress, to submit to Congress
a report setting forth in full the reasons and legal basis for the statement; and

96. ABA TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 4.
97. Press Release, American Bar Association, ABA Adopts New Policy on Presidential Signing
Statements, Attorney Client Privilege and Inspector General for the Federal Judiciary (Aug. 8, 2006),
http://www.abanet.org/media/releases/news08806_l.html.
98. ABA TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 4, at 1. See also Charlie Savage, Panel Chides Bush on
Bypassing Laws, BOSTON GLOBE, July 7, 2006, at Al.
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further requiring that all such submissions be available in a publicly
accessible database; and

FURTHER RESOLVED, That the American Bar Association urges Congress to
enact legislation enabling the President, Congress, or other entities or
individuals, to seek judicial review, to the extent constitutionally permissible,
in any instance in which the President claims the authority, or states the
intention, to disregard or decline to enforce all or part of a law he has signed,
or interprets such a law in a manner inconsistent with the clear intent of
Congress, and urges Congress and the President to support a judicial
99
resolution of the President's claim or interpretation.
Supporting the principles and intentions of the draftsmen of the
Constitution that require the president to either sign and enforce congressional
legislation or veto the entire bill, the report stated, "The Founding Fathers
contemplated bills with both attractive and unattractive features packaged in
one bill with heterogeneous provisions . . . [tIhe president nonetheless was
expected to veto even 'urgent' bills that he believed were unconstitutional in
part.. . ."100 A member of the Task Force also acknowledged the importance of
limiting the president's authority. 1° 1 The Recommendation noted that the
creation of the Task Force was prompted by the "number and nature" of
President Bush's signing statements, but pointed out that the recommendations
of the Task Force are intended to emphasize the gravity of the doctrine of
separation of powers, and are directed both to President Bush, and to all who
10 2
will succeed him in the presidential office.
A little less than a year after the release of the ABA Task Force Report, a
letter was drafted by the United States Government Accountability Office
(GAO). 103 The letter was directed to the Chairman of the Senate Committee on
Appropriations and the Chairman of the House Committee on the Judiciary,
and addressed the application of presidential signing statements to the fiscal
year 2006 appropriations acts. 1°4 GAO also examined the use of signing
statements by federal courts. 10 5 The findings revealed that all but one of the
twelve appropriations acts for the 2006 fiscal year included a signing statement
identifying constitutional concerns. 10 6 The letter also indicated that federal
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courts infrequently cited to signing statements and only rarely used them to
interpret the law. 10 7 However, the GAO did not assess the merits of the
President's challenges, or the constitutionality of the challenged legislative
108
provisions.
IV. HOUSE BILL

5993, THE

"PRESIDENTIAL SIGNING STATEMENTS

ACT

OF 2008"

On May 8, 2008, Representative Walter B. Jones (R-NC) introduced House
Bill 5993, the Presidential Signing Statements Act of 2008, which largely adopts
the Task Force's legislative recommendations. The purpose of the bill was "to
promote congressional and public awareness, understanding, and political
accountability of presidential signing statements." 10 9 To achieve its purpose,
House Bill 5993 requires that the president transmit copies of signing
statements to congressional leadership within three days of the issuance of the
statement, that the statements be published in the Federal Register, that the
executive staff testify as to the meaning and justification for presidential signing
statements upon the request of the House or Senate Judiciary Committee, and
that no monies be authorized or expended to implement any law accompanied
by a signing statement if these requirements are not met.110 As of July 28, 2008,
before the commencement of the summer congressional recess, House Bill 5993
was referred to the House Subcommittee on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and
111
Civil Liberties.
V.

THE PROBABILITY THAT HOUSE BILL
STATEMENTS ACT OF

2008,

5993, THE

PRESIDENTIAL SIGNING

WILL PASS MUSTER AND BECOME LAW

What is the likelihood that H.R. 5993 will become law? Considering that
the enactment of the Presidential Signing Statements Act of 2008 will depend
upon the endorsement of the president whose actions have instigated the call
for House Bill 5993, the probability is minimal.
The congressional findings of House Bill 5993 lay out the very hurdles that
the bill will have to overcome prior to becoming law. 112 President Bush's
assertion of this prerogative follows from his subjective interpretation of the
Constitution. 113 President Bush claims that he is operating within the
boundaries of his executive powers afforded by the Constitution, 114 and often
1
defends his use of signing statements by referring to Article ii. 15
Thus, it is foreseeable that President Bush will not endorse legislation that
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calls for action to stop him from doing what he believes he has the right to do
116
through the executive powers conferred on him in the Constitution.
President Bush is more likely to exercise his legislative veto power, a tool that
he has used only twelve times since he became president." 7 Or, in the unlikely
event that he signs the bill, House Bill 5993, like bills that came before it, could
be challenged with a signing statement. The outcome: an "unendorsed" piece
of legislation.
VI. IMPACT ON CURRENT ADMINISTRATION AND THE 2008 PRESIDENTIAL
CANDIDATES

For the sake of argument, what would be the effect if House Bill 5993
passed? Would its passage have an impact on the Bush Administration? With
less than 150 days left in President Bush's second term, and approximately two
months left in the last session of the 110th Congress, the passage of such
legislation would not have a significant impact on President Bush. Even highprofile bills are more likely to be hampered by filibusters, preventing the bills
from getting out of Congress. Ultimately, since 2008 is a presidential election
year, many bills may return in the forthcoming congressional session.
As to presidents, if House Bill 5993 were passed, they too would be
expected to adhere to the requirements of the law. The two 2008 presidential
candidates for the Democratic Party and the Republican Party have already
articulated their views regarding presidential signing statements. The nominee
for the Democratic Party, Senator Barack Obama, defends the legitimacy of
presidential signing statements, but condemns the use of signing statements to
evade laws or avoid accountability. 118 On the other hand, Republican
presidential candidate John McCain has publicly denounced President Bush's
use of signing statements. Responding to a question regarding the use of
signing statements, John McCain stated, "It is wrong, and it should not be
done."119
CONCLUSION

The President's unbridled use of signing statements, stemming from his
"larger-than-life" view of presidential prerogative, has resulted in an expansion
of executive power that challenges our balance of government. 120 Nevertheless,
there is a place for signing statements.
History, long-standing and
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contemporary, has provided signing statements with functions that are both
acceptable and necessary. The use of presidential signing statements is not
unconstitutional; rather, it is their abuse that has resulted in constitutional
questions. It is the unparalleled number of signing statements used by
President Bush to make constitutional and legal objections that has prompted
scrutiny and led to the introduction of legislation such as House Bill 5993.
House Bill 5993's overall goal is to strike a balance - to preserve the
separation of powers created by the forefathers of our democracy. Whether
House Bill 5993 (or other legislation with similar purposes) will become law
remains to be seen. However, perhaps it is not legislation that is needed to
strike this balance and prevent an abuse of power. Perhaps what is simply
needed is a person who is willing, in his or her capacity as the President of the
United States and in the absence of any legislation or judicial declaration, to
"preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United States," 121 and to
"take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed." 1

121. U.S. CONST., art II, § 1, c. 7.
122. U.S. CONST., art II, § 3.

